Bryan Pfaffenberger, University of Virginia Professor, on Logic and Accuracy Testing: "Logic and accuracy tests are dangerously vulnerable to a trivial exploit that involves inserting time-oriented code into the machine; the technique, described by Prof. Doug Jones of the University of Iowa, is so elementary that it is routinely assigned as a student exercise at Rice University." "Elections officials argue 'There are many other built in security features -- both in process and in equipment and software' (Charlottesville, VA Registrar of Voters, Frequently Asked Questions)   Perhaps so, but because vendors regard the voting machine software as a trade secret and will not permit objective outsiders to analyze the code, it is impossible to know whether the vendor's security features are effective.] In addition, state certification boards are insensitive to computer security issues and rush to approve systems that are full of security holes." http://pfaff.tcc.virginia.edu/home/MT/archives/000200.html                                      Dr. David L. Dill, Stanford University, on need for voter verifialbe audit trail: Computer scientists at John Hopkins released a report this summer stating that one company?s machines ?had significant and wide reaching security vulnerabilities? also that ?a malevolent developer could easily make changes to the code.?                                                                                       The threat seems so great to Stanford computer scientist David Dill that he began a campaign to prevent Santa Clara county from using these machines calling it ?crucial that voting equipment provide a voter-verifiable audit trail, by which we mean a permanent record of each vote that can be checked for accuracy by the voter before the vote is submitted, and is difficult or impossible to alter after it has been checked.    Many of the electronic voting machines being purchased do not satisfy this requirement.?       His petition was quickly signed by leaders in the computer security industry. http://verify.stanford.edu/dill/EVOTE/endorsements.html AVI RUBEN: Professor of Computer Science at Johns Hopkins University, on the source code of Diebold voting systems: and has appointment as the Technical Director of the Hopkins Information Security Institute. His website: http://avirubin.com/ His testimony for the Federal Election Assistance Commission on May 5, 2004,                                                   read here  http://avirubin.com/eac.pdf                                                                                                                                    He also has worked as an Election Judge this year. Examined the source code in one of the Diebold systems.