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SUGGESTED LETTER TO COUNTY ELECTION DIRECTOR, COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS MEMBERS, and COUNTY COMMISSIONERS - Regarding Reliable, Accessible, and Affordable voting machines that produce a voter verified paper ballot suitable for recounting or audits.
We now have TWO letters to be sent, the second one is more specific in asking about HAVA compliance.
We need you to
- find out when their county will be considering voting systems.
- send your county board of elections and elections director a letter, see sample letter below
- Please contact us if you can monitor your county Board of Elections activities, email us here
Find your county election director's contact information here: Link Please also contact the Board of Elections Members, 2 Republicans and 1 Democrat. The Board of Elections Members make the decision (vote) as to what type of voting systems you will get.
You may have to get the Board of Elections members' contact information from the Election Director, as this is not always directly available. You may have to use snail mail if email not available.
Sample letter to your County Election Director, also for County Board of Elections Members:
________________________________________________________________________________________
Letter 1:
Dear _________________:
I am a concerned citizen of ____________ County
A new law was passed by the State Legislature that will affect your county Board of Elections, providing a new requirement that all voting machines produce a voter verified paper ballot. [1] Counties may choose from optical scan systems with ballot marking devices, Direct Record Electronic systems (DREs) or hand counted paper ballots.
The new law requires manditory random audits of the paper ballot to the digital record, to ensure the accuracy of the machine count.
*Please advise how the county intends to proceed to comply with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and the new state law requiring voter-verified paper ballots under the tenets of SB 223. On what dates will you be considering this matter?
In choosing equipment, consider that any Direct Record Electronic machines (DREs), if used, will have to be fitted with a printer. This will produce a ballot on a reel (known as the toilet paper ballot).
Just this July 2005 in California, in a live test, the Diebold Touchscreen machines (with ballot on reel) had a 20% failure rate, with some machines crashing, exhibiting the blue screens of death, and some printers jamming up. [2]
This reel is about 4 inches wide, and about 80 feet long. It reduces the anonymity of the vote because the ballots are printed in sequential order. The ballots are on a continuous roll of paper. The print is small enough that some vendors have a magnifying glass in the cover over the ballot. Likewise, it is VERY hard to do a recount with these, taking up to one hour to recount four ballots. Further, the reel uses thermal paper, and it is possible that the ink could fade or become invisible, causing it to fail in it's purpose to conduct the recounts or audits as required by law.
Optical scan systems are more accessible, affordable, and more easily audited. Our County could purchase optical scan units and "ballot marking" devices for the disabled for a little less than $12,000.00 per precinct, all from existing federal funds.[3] These machines will meet all federal and state requirements. The other types of voting machines, called Direct Record Electronic, or DREs (touchscreen or pushbutton)cost at least 3 times more, and will not fully meet the disabled accessibility standards of the Help America Vote Act. [4]
The new law provides enough money to completely pay for optical scan/ballot marking systems for every county. Counties are eligible for up to $12,000. per precinct plus $1.00 per registered voter up to $100K limit. Counties will apply to the NC State Board of Elections for the funding. If counties want more expensive systems, the taxpayers will have to bear that burden.
We prefer that you consider the advice of the Verified Voting Foundation, who advises:
"Ballot Marking Best for Accessible and Verifiable Voting - Voters Can Have the Best of Both Worlds." August 3rd, 2005
San Francisco, CA - The Verified Voting Foundation (VVF) today published its initial detailed evaluation of the disability access features of voting systems that provide a voter-verified paper record.
"Our research demonstrates that ballot marking devices -- used by disabled voters to mark paper ballots in precinct-count optical scan voting systems -- provide the most complete combination of accessibility, accuracy, and verifiability of any voting systems on the market today," said VVF Executive Director Will Doherty. "We urge election administrators to choose a voting system that best meets the right of disabled voters to cast votes privately and independently, as well ensuring the voting system records and counts every vote accurately and securely." [5]
Therefore, please advise as to which types of voting systems you may be considering for purchase, including make, model and manufacturer.
Please review and respond at your earliest convenience.
Thank you for your hard work and service to the public.
Respectfully;
__________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
Letter 2:
Dear _______________ ;
1. Please advise how our county intends to proceed to comply with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and
the new state law requiring voter-verified paper ballots under the tenets of SB 223? Please note the recent
EAC advisory that clarifies requirements of HAVA.
2. On what date(s) will you be deciding this matter?
The recent EAC advisory on HAVA is clear that on January 1, 2006 - voting systems must be accessible to individuals with a wide range
of disabilities:
'The findings of Section 301(a)(3) discuss, in great detail, the requirements of HAVA as regards voting systems and accessibility of those systems by disabled voters. Notice that while some voting machine manufacturers and state officials have claimed that HAVA Section 301 does not require accessibility for any disabilities other than the blind, this advisory clearly says otherwise:
“Compliance with Section 301(a)(3) requires that the voting system is accessible to persons with disabilities as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act, including physical, visual, and cognitive disabilities, such that the disabled individual can privately and independently receive instruction, make selections, and cast a ballot.”
Category and description of some disabilites --
A. "Vision" = The voting process shall be accessible to voters with visual disabilities, including partial vision, poor vision, color blindness, and blindness.
B. "Dexterity" = The voting process shall be accessible to voters who lack fine motor control or the use of their hands. All keys and controls should be operable with one hand and not require strong grasping, pinching, or twisting of the wrist.
C. "Mobility" = The voting process shall be accessible to voters who use mobility aids, including wheelchairs. All controls should be within reach of the voter.
D. "Hearing" = The voting process shall be accessible to voters with hearing disabilities, providing both audio and visual cues to the voter. Also no voting station will require speech for its operation.
E. "Cognitive" = The voting process shall be accessible to voters with cognitive disabilities. All voters should be able to negotiate the process effectively, efficiently, and comfortably.
Respectfully;
___________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Additional Materials for review :
DREs still are immature and faulty technology, even with a paper ballot
DREs may mess up at any point, leaving voters unable to vote. Optical scan systems on the other hand have the voter vote first and the relationship to the machine is just for tabulation purposes. So an error or shutdown in the machine would not stop or hinder an election.
Because the relationship between the voter and the machine in DREs is the entire length of the voting process, whereas in optical scan systems it only last the length of time necessary to feed a sheet of paper into the machine, LONGER WAIT TIMES OCCUR WITH DREs even if counties buy the recommended 1 DRE per 250 voters.
Today's DREs do not meet the HAVA disabled accessibility requirements effective in 2006 --
Optical Scanners have improved over the years, scanners from the early-to-mid-90s did have problems, but those have been reduced drastically in the last few years. See http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/optical/
New models of optical scans have excellent features such as --
- alerts voter of undervotes or overvotes
- can record precinct data for absentee or 1 stop voting
- ballot on demand - this means the printer can print out an absentee ballot on demand
- the printer can print 30 pages a minute. This is less expensive for the election authority and also more convenient.
Purchase Costs up to 4 times higher with DRES --
Financially speaking, the DREs are more expensive to acquire (need 4-5 times more than Optical Scans), maintain, and are very fragile so they reduce usability quickly over time. Optical scans are cheaper, more efficient, and are a better way to go.
- DREs - cost from $20,000 up to $45,000 per precinct, depending on number of voters, ( serving 150 to 200 voters ea) at $3,000 - $4,500 each total per precinct
- Optical scanners - cost from $10,000 to $12,000 per precinct including 1 ballot marking device http://www.ncvoter.net/affordable.html
- State Grant money will pay completely for the optical scan solution, but not for the more expensive DREs.
Operating Costs for DREs are 50-60% higher than with optical scanners -- this means higher taxes.
North Carolina study of 4 large counties shows that DREs cost 1.5 times more per year to operate.
DRES with paper ballot on a reel have inherent problems --
Our state may only choose from the DREs currently that use the "toilet paper ballot", that claim to have a paper ballot, but instead the "ballot" is printed on a continuous roll similar to the journal tape on cash registers. Problems are:
- difficult for the voter to verify
- prints ballots in sequential order, ballot can be tied to voter
- difficult and time consuming for post election audits or recounts
- disabled cannot verify their paper ballot, as do machines with full size paper ballots.
- uses thermal paper, which tends to become invisible over time
Usability, Undervotes, Accessibility: DREs have higher undervotes, this is a fact --
Disabled Accessible Voting Systems: DREs do not meet disabled accessbility requirements of HAVA --
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